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Introduction 
Information about terrorism offences is, inevitably, tightly controlled by the state, whether it 
relates to the preparation or commission of offences or to the actions of the authorities tasked 
with combating terrorism. These are matters of great public interest and the media¶s fourth-
estate role in informing the public is extremely important in terrorism matters. Traditions of 
media freedom characterise and sustain open, informed public debate²the basis of the 
public¶s µright to know¶²and the ability to effectively access and report information is a 
mainstay of those traditions. It is surprising then that journalists¶ experience of reporting on 
terrorism has received little attention and has not been the subject of sustained empirical 
work. Yet it warrants close attention because, as Cram has noted, µwhile some additional 
degree of restraint is inevitable and justified¶, limits on media freedom µconstitute a threat to 
expressive freedom, putting at risk the informed scrutiny of government policy and executive 
conduct¶.1 The media experience is especially significant as governments increasingly pursue 
laws that enable information to be kept secret in an ever-widening range of circumstances.2 
The legal changes are accompanied by an acute political caution regarding the release of 
information.  
 
This chapter examines how practices of information control and access in the United 
Kingdom affect the media when reporting on terrorism and security. It does so by looking at 
WKHH[SHULHQFHVRIMRXUQDOLVWVZKRKDYHFRYHUHGWHUURULVPPDWWHUV,WXVHVMRXUQDOLVWV¶ZRUGV
to convey their experiences and interactions with those who work within legal institutions 
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and with Muslim communities affected where terrorism matters arise, as Muslim 
FRPPXQLWLHV KDYH LQFUHDVLQJO\ EHFRPH µVXVSHFW FRPPXQLWLHV¶ LQ WKH SRVW  ODQGVFDSH. 
After briefly outlining the research and its methodology, three areas are addressed: first, 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶ DFFHVV WR LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKH SHULRG IROORZLQJ WHUURULVP DUUHVWV EXW SULRU WR
charges being laid; second, access to information once a matter reaches the courts; and third, 
the ways journalists may be required to reveal information to the authorities.3  
 
It will be suggested that where terrorism and security is in issue, the public right to know 
about what is happening in our communities and what is being done by [140] our state is 
neither adequately protected nor appropriately respected. There is no doubt that both 
institutions and the individuals within them face very difficult challenges and numerous 
obstacles as they try to carry out their work, but these challenges can and must be met more 
effectively²and must not be hindered by laws and practices that embed secrecy and distrust 
as the norm²if democratic accountability is to be pursued. 
 
0HWKRGRORJ\ DQG FRQWH[W 7KH µ/DZ 7HUURULVP DQG WKH 5LJKW WR .QRZ¶
project  
The research for this chapter was undertaken as part of the µLaw, Terrorism and the Right to 
Know¶ research programme. Running from 2009±13, the project explored how governments 
and courts deal with security-related information, and the relationships between the state and 
the media. It examined matters such as how different parties involved in controlling and 
communicating information understand and draw connections between principles of open 
justice, the rule of law, public accountability and national security. It explored how 
information can be selectively and strategically presented or concealed, how access can be 
controlled, and what the effects of these processes might be.  
 
The project included around 70 confidential research interviews conducted over 18 months in 
2010±12. Interviewees were drawn from the judiciary and courts, government, policing, legal 
profession, and²most relevantly for this chapter²journalists, media lawyers and editorial 
decision-makers. Most interviews were UK-oriented, though a small number were conducted 
in Australia and the United States with individuals from those countries.4  
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Sixteen print and broadcast journalists were interviewed. Some had long experience in 
reporting on terrorism matters for UK outlets (both national and regional) and some had also 
reported for international outlets. They included journalists with many years¶ experience in 
terrorism and related areas such as crime, home affairs and court reporting. In a few instances 
interviewees had covered only one terrorism matter, but had done so in depth.  
 
The political and legal context in which the interviews were conducted is noteworthy. First, 
the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press ran for a year from 
November 2011.5 Although it dominated the headlines, it was not a significant point of 
reference in the interviews. As the next section explains, although it provides some 
information about the issues, for the most part it was not concerned with police-media 
relationships in the terrorism context. Secondly, and this was a point of reference in 
interviews, legislation was being debated that would increase secrecy in civil proceedings. 
This was occurring against the background of increasing scepticism about the propriety or 
legality of the ways authorities have operated in combating terrorism. The archetypal cases 
were actions against the British government by former Guantanamo Bay detainees returned to 
the UK without having been charged, but the provisions in the Bill that would become the 
Justice and Security Act 2013 applied to all civil [141] proceedings. They would overcome 
the Supreme Court¶s decision in Al Rawi v The Security Services6 that closed material 
proceedings could not be used in civil actions. With journalists less willing to accept at face 
value claims made by the authorities (especially about the actions of the state), and expanding 
secrecy laws that would prevent scrutiny, the issues under discussion were very much in the 
minds of interviewees. Consequently, interviewees were often very reflective about both their 
experiences and what the current debates might mean for the future. 
 
-RXUQDOLVWV¶DFFHVVWRLQIRUPDWLRQDIWHUDUUHVWV 
Terrorism activities come into the media and public eye when arrests are made. Only very 
occasionally are arrests made after an act of violence has been committed. Most arrests are 
made when the authorities suspect individuals possess materials or are engaged in activities 
that are preparatory to committing a terrorist act. There may be simultaneous arrests in 
different cities. As such, arrests will not be predictable and it may be unclear for some time 
exactly who has been arrested on what basis. As journalists struggle to get a reliable picture 
of what has happened and what is suspected, they will be heavily reliant in the first instance 
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on information from police. However, that information may be minimal, and journalists will 
want to test its accuracy and completeness. This, it was explained by interviewees, can be 
very, very difficult.  
 
To verify information they have been given and to obtain further information not generally 
available, the µcritical thing¶ for journalists is µsources, having their trust so they will talk to 
you, and then making an assessment of what they teOO\RX¶7 In terrorism and security matters, 
both the trust and assessment aspects are difficult because µjournalists are distrusted by police 
and by the Muslim communities where arrested persons will often live or will have family or 
other connections¶8 Media relationships with police and communities are tested in these 
circumstances, and especially before anyone is charged or where no charges are made.  
 
Relationships with police and security services 
 
The Leveson Inquiry revealed that around the time of the 7/7 London bombings in 20059 
there was a close relationship between police and crime reporters. Police would brief 
journalists off the record on the basis that there was µan overwhelming public interest¶ in 
conveying to the public any terrorist threat to the UK, though without prejudicing 
investigations or trials.10 With one exception, it appears that information about terrorism 
investigations was never leaked to the media.11 Rather, information would generally be 
provided to the media only in order to prevent a report being published that may adversely 
affect an investigation.12 As such, even while Leveson was critical of the close relationship 
between some police and some journalists, and there was much discussion of how 
unattributable or off-the-record briefings are problematic, there is nothing in the Leveson 
Inquiry to suggest that journalists ever found it easy to obtain information about terrorism 
investigations. [142] On the whole, the Leveson Inquiry does not tell us a great deal about the 
media experience of terrorism reporting. What, then, do journalists say about their dealings 
with the authorities when reporting on terrorism? 
 
All journalists reporting on terrorism matters have interactions and relationships with the 
police, via both police press offices and individual contacts, but most do not have direct 
relationships with the security services.13 When arrests have taken place, the authorities are a 
key source of information, but journalists are µentirely vulnerable to being misled and really 
you have to cultivate contacts who you trust greatly¶14  
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The limited sources of information and the vulnerability were regularly raised. One journalist 
thought there was: 
 
a huge problem about total reliance on government interpretation of intelligence and evidence 
presented in the early days of an investigation. « [T]he media can quite easily be, and has been, 
persuaded to follow a particular course of enquiry which has later transpired not to be [correct].15  
 
Terrorism cases operated differently. Police contacts were not a fruitful avenue of 
information because, unlike the general run of criminal matters, iQFOXGLQJVHULRXVFULPHµ,t¶s 
different because ultimately it¶s controlled by MI5, so even your usual police contacts don¶t 
want to say anything. They might claim they don¶t know anything.¶16 For another: µWe 
couldn¶t get out anything out of anyone. The police just locked down like you would not 
believe. Usually on big stories they do have their protocols in what they can say but they will 
usually give you something²and we had nothing to go on.¶17 Journalists are aware of the 
difficult position police may be in and want to maintain ongoing good relationships; while 
obviously seeking information from police, µI don¶t want to compromise them either.¶18 
 
The information shutdown can be sweeping. One journalist recalled not being able to find out 
in what street in a regional city some arrests had occurred overnight. There was no 
information coming in as there usually would be from, for example, neighbours in the street. 
The police did not arrive with flashing lights and so, even if neighbours had woken up and 
looked out the window they would not have thought much of it; as a result, µit happened 
without anyone seeming to know about it¶ and so the next day was a matter of µtraipsing 
round, jXVWKRSLQJWRVWXPEOHDFURVVLW¶19 Another described what happens once the street or 
house is located:  
 
,W ZDVQ¶W OLNH QRUPDOO\²there was no police line of officers outside in uniform. [But] it was quite 
REYLRXV«)RULQVWDQFHWKHUHZHUHDFRXSOHRISURSHUWLHVLQDQDUHDZKLFKKDVJRWDKLJK%0(>EODFN
minority and ethnic] population, with a couple of middle class white guys stood outside the door 
dressed very well. « [It] makes everything harder because it is, in one sense, obvious that it¶s that 
property. But [the police] won¶t confirm it. Neighbours are talking, but [143] it¶s hard. You¶ve got to 
give your readers something, but how do you confirm? Because [the police] won¶t confirm this, they 
won¶t confirm that.20 
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The µlack of information fuels speculation¶, which is unnecessary and counter-productive.21 
The police may also provide some steer. The following is a typical example:  
 
[They] will, sort of, give you on a scale of 1-to-KRZVHULRXV WKHVHDUUHVWVDUH«3ROLFHDUHTXLWH
understanding of [our needs]. If it¶s a biggie, then we are going to need to deploy a satellite truck, 
producers, camera crews. We¶re asking, really, because of the logistics involved. We have limited 
resources. [If] we throw everything up to a raid in Birmingham and it turns out one bloke with some 
dodgy DVDs, then it¶s not worth it. If it¶s three or four guys building a bomb, then it¶s going to be 
major news, it¶VSUREDEO\JRLQJWROHDGRXUEXOOHWLQV:HQHHGWR«JDXJHWKDW. [Arrests] come up on 
the wires, [my news desk will ask] me, µShould we send on this?¶ « , QHHG WR DQVZHU WKDW DOPRVW
instantly.22 
 
There was some very strong criticism of press officers in the counter-terrorism units: 
 
They release very short on the record statements which may or may not be true. But then what the 
public and civil society is oblivious to is that then you get all the off the record briefing. And it can 
[come from] senior cops, and it can be spooks [security services officers]. But actually a lot of the time 
it¶s press officers disguised as senior police sources and they use that off the record briefing to twist 
and slant news coverage beyond what the [on the record] statement has already done.23 
 
To that journalist, µall state sponsored press officers¶ have a function which µessentially is 
kind of a barrier between the people who hold information, the truth if you like and those 
who are trying to get it out. They are not enablers they are kind of preventers¶.24 Other 
interviewees did not characterise that so strongly, but there was much scepticism of the way 
police officers present facts: 
 
The largest obstacles are officialdom itself, the uneasiness that exists within the relationship between 
official press officers and the media. There is a default position, there¶s a complete unwillingness to 
share information. That means that journalists like myself look elsewhere and we try to forge unofficial 
relationships as much as possible.25  
 
Not all police forces or counterterrorism units were seen to be the same. One journalist saw 
some as simply unhelpful, and others, although they perhaps provided more information, 
were misleading: µI don¶t know if I believe anything [144] that [X Police Force] say to me, 
certainly about counterterrorism operations.¶26 Regardless of the differences across units or 
forces, the one-sidedness of information at the time of arrests inherently raised great 
difficulties: 
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It is very hard to test information that you are being spoon fed and it is so sensitive by nature that it is 
almost impossible. [T]here is an acceptance of credibility which you can¶t afford really to go behind. 
«$ELWODWHURQ>\RX@DUHLQDEHWter position to question some of the facts that you were given at the 
time. This is usually [through] information which emerges through the lawyers working for the 
suspects and a better picture emerges.27 
 
The scepticism is endemic and more acutely felt where the security services are concerned: 
µThe instinctive position of the security forces is to provide the media with something that 
they believe will serve their own purposes.¶28 Of course, this is not necessarily any different 
from the approach taken by anyone dealing with the media; in all circumstances, µyou¶re kind 
of constantly aware that [everybody you speak to has] got their own agenda¶.29 Nonetheless, 
the security services seemed more able than the police to entice journalists into believing 
what they were told. The way an experienced journalist searches for words helps illustrate 
both the difficulty of obtaining information and the vulnerability to being misled when 
dealing with the security services: 
 
If I wasn¶t sure of something, I would say, µIf I were to say this, would that be accurate?¶ And they 
would say, µWell, it¶s not a million miles wide of the mark¶, or something like that. So it¶VDVRUWRI«
DOPRVW«LW¶s not a game, but it¶V«LW¶V«LW¶V«LW¶s a testing process. I think it¶V«,WKLQk it¶s quite 
«SRWHQWLDOO\«QRWGDQJHURXVEXW«XQZLVHIRU«\RXNQRZ\RXQJUHSRUWHUVZKRDUHVWDUWLQJRXW
GRLQJWKLVEHDWWRDSSUHFLDWHZKDWWKH\RXNQRZZKDWWKH«ZKDWWKHSLWIDOOVDUH And they may be 
PRUHYXOQHUDEOHWRVSLQQHU«VSLQQHU\ZKLFKKDppens, you know, than I would.30 
 
One was: 
µD ELW VXVSLFLRXV RI VRPH RI P\ FROOHDJXHV FORVHQHVV WR WKH VHFXULW\ VHUYLFHV 6RPH « VRXQG OLNH
mouth pieces for various agencies. You have to be constantly on your guard at getting too close to 
these people, about being sucked into their world and feeling like, µOh, you know, well I owe him a 
favour,¶ and all this, that and the other.¶31  
 
The difference between dealing with the security services and the police was that the former 
could and would shut people out if they so chose, and there was little or no recourse: 
 
The police are kind of big enough and ugly enough to have an argument with and fall out with and then 
\RXEXLOGEULGJHVZLWKWKHP«:LWK0,WKH\[145] RQO\VSHDNWRFHUWDLQMRXUQDOLVWV«:HKDYHQ¶t 
had a big falling out yet but I get the feeling that if you piss them off then they cut you off. And I know 
there are certain journalists that they don¶t talk to who write about their worlds continually. And to my 
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mind, that¶s unhelpful because that is not an open or two way kind of thing. I mean, they don¶t really 
fucking tell you anything anyway. They tell you what they want to tell you and they have stuff they 
want to push. But when you go in with a direct question you get, you get almost non-answers really. I 
find it a quite unsatisfactory relationship.32 
 
There were suggestions that the security services should hold open, on-the-record briefings 
for journalLVWV µ,I WKH\ GLG¶ , DVNHG µ&ould those be trusted?¶ µNo¶ ZDV WKH UHVSRQVH 
µBecause you can¶t trust anything. But at least we know who said it and when.¶33 The 
scepticism about the agencies¶ dealings with the media was not a criticism, as such, of the 
agencies¶ work. There was acceptance that the security services are managing difficult issues, 
have had great success in disrupting plots, and often are unable to secure recognition. For 
example, where a case does not proceed to court and information does not come out²it 
either ends up in closed proceedings in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or a 
plot is disrupted before there is sufficient evidence to charge a person with an offence²then 
there is a well-recognised effect on the security services: µIt¶VDSUREOHPIRUWKHP«EHFDXVH
they don¶t, they can¶WVKRZDQ\UHVXOWV«>%XW@ZKHQWKH\JHWDUesult they¶re very keen to 
make a big show of it.¶34 
 
Relationships with Muslim communities 
 
With information from the authorities tending to be minimal and, on occasion, even 
misleading, there is a great need to supplement, test and verify what is made available by the 
state. To do that, sources in local communities where arrests have occurred will be crucial. 
There is now an established literature on British Muslim communities as suspect 
communities and, within that, documentation of media coverage of those communities and 
how such coverage is perceived within them.35 The experience of journalists¶ is consistent 
with that literature. Journalists frequently engage with Muslim communities, either with 
families or neighbours of those arrested or at a more representative level through 
organisations or perhaps someone respected in the community the defendant calls home. 
Responses were unequivocal: when engaging with Muslim communities journalists found a 
µhuge, huge¶, µmassive¶ lack of trust of members of the media and thought they were seen by 
many µas the enemy¶.36 Faced with the media, Muslim locals would µ[shut] up shop or [be] 
withdrawing into themselves.¶37 
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Importantly, journalists were unsurprised by this; in fact, they thought it understandable and 
justifiable that communities were µpretty cynical about the media¶.38 Journalists themselves 
saw the media as having contributed to the environment of distrust through a lack of in-depth 
analysis, knee-jerk reactions, and tendencies to sensationalise.39 µYou can¶t really blame the 
Muslim community,¶ said one. µThey do get an awful kicking and they¶re rightly suspicious I 
think.¶40 Said another, µI [146] think they see the media as part of the prosecution, you know, 
a part of the Islamophobia that is evident in British society.¶41 
 
When asked about whether it is possible or appropriate to speak of µthe Muslim community¶, 
one respondent argued that it was not because there were differences across ethnic 
backgrounds, age groups and strands of belief, but that, nevertheless, µ$ll those communities, 
I¶m pretty sure, feel under the same kind of pressure.¶42  
 
You¶re fighting the mindset, which is really difficult, because the community feels itself under siege, 
under attack, victimised, stereotyped. I¶m not talking about families whose sons are in jail for terrorist 
offences, I¶m talking about the community as a whole.43 
 
A raid resulting in arrests will combine with subsequent media presence to fuel community 
caution and cynicism. First the police arrive: 
 
Police raids do have a big impact on the community, especially when [those arrested are] subsequently 
released when they haven¶t got the evidence to charge them, but also, the reason why it happens. ... It¶s 
... GLVUXSWLYH«LW¶s to break up the cell. So they know they¶re being watched.44 
 
Next, the media descends:  
 
It¶s very difficult to build relationships and trust with people that you just sort of parachute into their 
neighbourhood for a couple of days and, and bang on every door and have cameras everywhere and 
then you bugger off to the next circus. People like myself should probably be spending more time 
investing in people in those communities.45 
 
The journalists in the pack are not only from outside the communities, but their relationship 
with Muslim communities is also µas white journalists, to be brutally KRQHVW¶ DQG ZKHQ a 
person is charged µmy job would be to look at background and I will go out to that house and 
knock on the neighbours doors but you tend to find (a) animosity, (b) mistrust¶46  
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How, then, can journalists build relationships of trust? They need to put in time, just as they 
would in building any relationship.47 It is a slow process: µ>7@hey weren¶t prepared to do 
anything without long conversations about what I was going to do with the information and 
how I felt the information might be used.¶48 They µhave to go into the community²that is the 
only way to do it¶.49  
 
*RQHDUHWKHGD\VZKHQ\RXFDQSLFNXSWKHSKRQHDQGVSHDNWRSHRSOHZKRUHSUHVHQW«PHPEHUVRI
>D@ 0XVOLP FRPPXQLW\ DQG H[SHFW WR JHW « D PHDQLQJIXO DQswer. You would [now] get a µno 
comment¶ or a platitude that is a summary of what you knew already. You won¶t get the kind of in-
depth analysis or intelligence that perhaps you are looking for. 50  
 
[147] While µit¶s not impossible¶ to build relationships, whether by µshow[ing] a degree of 
empathy and understanding¶ or µjust [being] persuasive¶, it is: 
 
more difficult [as] all the tabloids turn up with huge wodges of cash basically saying, µLet me buy your 
story.¶ And it will normally work with the white neighbours next door who¶ve got some stuff to slag 
off about them. But for the actual Muslim communities²for the kernel of the story²that doesn¶t 
work.51 
 
One (white British) senior journalist described an approach not seeking to develop sources 
directly:  
 
Getting the contacts within the Muslim community is really, really difficult, because there is an inbuilt 
PLVWUXVW RI « RXWVLGHUV QRQ-Muslims, those who work for [major media]. And there is a natural 
reluctance to have anything to do with people like me. Not because of who I am or what I¶ve done, but 
because of what I represent in their eyes.52  
 
Instead, contacts and relationships were built by Muslim colleagues, and that was productive:  
 
They refused to meet me. [Among the reasons], I think they would have been concerned that if I¶d 
interviewed them I would have given them a much, much harder time. But in a way, that¶s no bad 
thing. They gave extremely frank, blunt interviews with my colleagues, which they would not have 
done with me, because I would have had to challenge them, and they would have probably clammed 
up.53 
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The µtendency for reporters [to] always work in packs¶, the dynamic of media presence and 
competition for stories does not make it easy for journalists to build individual relationships 
over time. A good example of how news desk demands affect relationship-building was 
explained by a journalist who had secured an interview against the odds:  
 
>2@QHJX\«KDGVSHQW>WZRGD\V@RXWVLGHWKHPRVTXHEHLQJLQWHUYLHZHG«>2QO\RQFH@HYHU\RQHKDG
gone ... we just started chatting. And I think it was because it was no longer the pack that he kind of 
RSHQHG XS « [But] if you are in that pack and you are all roaming around the streets looking for 
quotes, you¶re always going to find it really, really hard. But the thing is that¶s what the news desk 
wants. They don¶t want to be behind the competition so they will want everyone to kind of work 
together. They¶ll be a bit nervous about someone saying, µRight I¶m going off on my own to do my 
own thing.¶54 
 
The experience of reporting on terrorism arrests is unlike crime reporting generally. The 
authorities reveal less information, either formally or informally. What [148] is revealed is 
less likely to be reliable and, with communities less prepared to provide information to the 
media, it will be more difficult to test. Few things will be clear or certain; the circumstances 
do not lend themselves to any other outcome. Once charged, a person will be brought before 
the courts and then any information obtained and reported will be (hopefully) more reliable.  
 
The legal process: Obtaining information after charge 
Where a person is charged with terrorism offences in England or Wales, his or her first court 
appearance is at Westminster Magistrates¶ Court in London.55 That appearance is the media¶s 
first opportunity to see the charge sheet (although there are no systematic processes in place 
to provide it) and it is also the first time the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) reveals the 
allegations. Ideally the police leading the operation provide a press statement that usually 
includes a contribution from the CPS. An excellent example was a press release by West 
Midlands Police in December 2010, which listed names, ages and addresses of those charged, 
along with particulars of the offence, and comments from the CPS.56 That level of 
information was thought by journalists to be useful and appropriate, but was also said to be 
the exception rather than the rule.  
 
The first appearance will dispel or confirm pre-charge speculation about the allegations, 
though reports will inevitably be one-sided. The allegations can be reported and, driven by 
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editorial demands, there may be µa tendency towards spectacular writing, towards 
hyperbole¶57 or µa tendency to go for the hottest line you can and sometimes to ignore 
inconvenient facts in order to promote the best story¶58 Defence lawyers will not have a great 
deal of information and will tend to say little or nothing at all. It would not be unusual for 
defence lawyers (with no objection from the Crown) to seek reporting restrictions on details 
regarding their clients. Where a group is arrested and some members are charged and some 
released, the releases will garner little attention. It is the case against those who are charged 
that is of interest.  
 
Information will rarely come out until trial. While journalists µmight get the odd leak¶, they 
µdon¶t get anything until [they] hear it in court usually¶59 
 
Criminal trials 
 
Trials are about contested versions of events. The Crown has alleged a person has committed 
criminal offences and the accused person has pleaded not guilty. However, not every issue is 
contested. On the contrary, much will be uncontested and a µmuch more firm¶ factual picture 
will emerge:  
 
Agreed statements, admissions, facts that are just completely indisputable. «<RXJHWWKHDPRXQWVRI
money. [You get] the travel patterns²he went here, he went there. [You get] the emails. All of that 
stuff comes out and that¶s gold dust really.60 
 
[149] The authorities will almost certainly be pleased that this kind of uncontested 
information is in the public domain, even if it is many months after the arrests. At trials 
journalists will µget to see sensitive material¶61 and will hear first-hand accounts:  
 
No matter how many miles you walk and no matter how many people you speak [to at the end of the 
day] the best stuff always comes out. [Y]ou¶ve got the defendant speaking for themselves, or the 
defendant¶s mother speaking. You¶ve got the cops speaking. You¶ve got a cop saying, µWell, I broke 
down the door and this is what I saw.¶62  
 
This, for reporters, is a part of democratic public scrutiny: µThat stuff only ever comes out in 
court and court reporting is so important it is fundamental to our democracy.¶63 With most 
organisations financially pressed, sitting through a long-running case was described as µa 
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luxury¶ and was worrying because in court: µInstead of getting the embellished stuff and the 
VSLQDQGWKHEXOOVKLW\RXJHW«ZKDWWKH\KDYHWRWHOOWKHMXU\ That¶s limited to an extent but 
you do get more facts and I think more reliable information.¶64  
 
For major trials, including terrorism trials, embargoed media briefings by police and the CPS 
will also be important, enabling reporters to µlearn more about the background [to the case 
and] to question about what [investigators] did and what they didn¶t do and why they did it. 
And that can be very useful¶65 That said, these briefings are a way for the state to parade its 
strengths. The journalist continued: 
 
[I]f you want to learn more about [what] investigators would like to conceal about their investigations 
then you really will find it a lot more difficult because you¶ll be met with, generally, denial, 
obfuscation, people misleading you, sometimes people threaten you. Trying to learn the truth about that 
[can be] extraRUGLQDULO\GLIILFXOWDQGFHUWDLQO\«RQHSODFHZKHUH\RXVKRXOGJRLVOLVWHQWRWKHOHJDO
argument that precedes trials in which lawyers try to argue about what will be admissible in evidence. 
Much of [that] will be heard in camera and it seems to me, from what I know now, that they will be 
heard in camera effectively to conceal evidence of official wrongdoing. But some of it will come out. 
«6RPHWLPHVLWLVSRVVLEOH>WRILQGRQHRUWZRSHRSOHWKHUHZKRZLOOLQGLFDWHWR\RXVRPHWKLQJRIZKDW
was said in camera]. But you also have the problem of sometimes people will deliberately leak 
something to you in order to give you a misleading impression of what¶s been said in camera.66 
 
Reporting the courts 
 
In spite of the value of press and public scrutiny of criminal trials, and even though 
journalists generally consider the Judicial Communications Office to be a useful point of 
access to basic information, reporting the courts is not easy.67 Journalists described feeling 
unwelcome, and being treated µas a nuisance¶68 and as µsecond [150] class citizens¶69 They 
were critical of poor press facilities and a lack of awareness of media needs.70 There were 
strong criticisms of the lack of access to materials:  
 
We are sitting in a court trying to report a case and the entire courtroom will have documents in front 
of them that they¶re reading from, which we¶re not given access to. They will skip through these 
documents, they¶ll refer to paragraph seven and they¶OOIOLFNEDFNWRSDUDJUDSKVL[«$QGZHZRQ¶t 
have any idea what they¶re talking about.71 
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Most journalists reported little contact with judges, one describing the judiciary as µinvisible¶ 
and having no contact µwhatsoever, H[FHSWZKHQWKH\WHOO\RXRII¶72  The criticisms may not 
be entirely justified, or at least do not present the full picture. First, these perceptions are 
markedly out of kilter with judicial views of the media¶s role and reporting on terrorism 
cases.73 Generally, the judiciary takes the view that the media has an important and valuable 
role in reporting on terrorism cases. Judges tended to see themselves as doing their best to 
accommodate media interests, though they were largely of the view that the courts were not 
providers of information for the media, but adjudicators where the media may want access to 
material. They should not be µentering into the ring to take part in a boxing match¶UDWKHU
they should be µthe umpire¶74  
 
Second, the media can request material from the Crown and so the judiciary¶s perception of 
its role makes some sense in this context. A protocol agreed by the CPS, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and media bodies enables the media to request prosecution 
material.75 Journalists criticised police selectivity in the material provided. For example, only 
extracts of terrorist training videos shown in court would be released; parts that suggested the 
accused were incompetent were not made available.76 Still, the police and the CPS have been 
described as µpretty even-handed¶77 and on the whole the protocols provide a good pathway 
to accessing prosecution material, even though µwe get a boiled down, cut down version of 
what we want¶78 Sitting alongside the protocols are more recent Criminal Procedure Rules 
that allow access to documents.79 The courts have held that these rules are important and a 
fundamental aspect of securing effective open justice.80  
 
Relationships with defence lawyers 
 
With scepticism about information supplied by the state, and difficulty in obtaining 
information through the courts, do defence lawyers play an important role? To some extent, 
the answer is yes. Not every defence lawyer deals with or is helpful to the media; some µare 
great, very helpful and very talkative¶ while others are µvery unhelpful¶81 The former can be 
important sources, even while they work within legal and ethical constraints. They may 
provide information that is not restricted, but that is not easily accessible. Journalists, though, 
are still rightly cautious. Some defence lawyers, it was said, have µsophisticated media 
strategy plans, [151] [are] very experienced and know exactly what to say and when to say 
it¶82 Some may µmanipulate¶ journalists.83 They are µnot stupid¶ DQG WKH\ DUH QRW QDLve; 
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rather, they µwill taONZKHQLWLVLQWKHLULQWHUHVW¶84 On one view, this makes them no different 
from prosecution or police; whatever the party, µself-serving documents¶ will be passed on to 
the media.85 
 
At heart, though, lawyer-journalist relationships are simply professional, each acting with 
their respective interests in mind. Lawyers are acting for a client and²not without reason²
are usually cautious. They can be µvery wary¶ because µthere is a tendency [and we are guilty 
of this] to cover the prosecution and not the defence¶86 The reciprocal position was expressed 
well by a lawyer who said that it is easy to be on one¶s guard against µless friendly elements 
of the press¶ and µmore difficult to be guarded with [those you trust a lot]¶ but:  
 
still at the back of my mind is, µYou are a journalist. What if I let something slip?¶Can I really? [That 
person] is just going to get this out there. And they are good at their job. They are good at getting stuff 
out of you even when you don¶t really think you are saying that much.87 
 
Journalists are reporting on matters of public interest and while they may be friendly with 
lawyers, that does not stop them reporting: µI just have to make a difficult phone call at 10 
o¶clock at night and say, you know, ³I¶m sorry. I¶m going to shit all over your client 
tomorrow.´¶88 On both sides, trust is the central issue to the relationship. It is an acceptance 
that journalists and lawyers have different roles, but that they can co-exist. This was captured 
well by a journalist who said there are lawyers µwho will not mislead me. They may not be in 
a position to tell me the whole [story] because they¶re bound by the court, but they will not 
mislead me, and will not if possible allow me to mislead myself, to make wrong 
assumptions¶89  
 
While journalists¶ main challenges will ordinarily lie in obtaining information, they may also 
be challenged by the legal requirement to disclose to the authorities information they have 
obtained. This challenge cannot go unremarked because the laws are a component part of the 
state¶s management and control of information. The fact that it is less visible than the 
difficulties associated with obtaining information does not render it less important.  
 
The other side of the coin: jRXUQDOLVWV¶REOLJDWLRQVWRGLVFORVHLQIRUPDWLRQ 
Journalists are not immune to or unfamiliar with demands for information. Journalistic 
materials can be sought using a µproduction order¶ obtained under the Police and Criminal 
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Evidence Act 1984 (UK) (PACE) or, in terrorism matters, under the less demanding 
provisions on the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK).90 However, these established procedures are 
only engaged when the state requests material. There is no general obligation in British law 
for anyone to provide information to the authorities.  
 
[152] Terrorism legislation changes that general position. Under s 38B of the Terrorism Act 
2000, a person who has information µwhich he knows or believes might be of material 
assistance¶ in preventing an act of terrorism or apprehending or prosecuting an offender must 
disclose that information to the authorities. A failure to do so carries a punishment of up to 
five years imprisonment. It is a defence if a person has µa reasonable excuse¶ for not 
disclosing, though µreasonable excuse¶ is undefined. The offence existed in Northern Ireland 
from the mid-1970s but it was always controversial.91 It was not a part of the Terrorism Act 
2000²it was expressly rejected²but was inserted in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks in New 
York City.92 The provision is aimed at families, friends and others close to people who are 
planning or have committed offences, but it can clearly apply to others, including journalists. 
 
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, has remarked 
upon this potential application in his annual reports.93 In the academic literature, only Clive 
Walker has paid substantial attention to the laws, also observing the potential application.94 
Anderson concludes that the fears µhave not been realised in practice¶, noting that there have 
been no prosecutions of journalists and, though he indicates that police may tend to give 
communities µa firm reminder¶ of the implications of failing to disclose information, he does 
not indicate that police approach journalists in this way.95 He does, however, consider that 
µthere is no doubt that some journalists have the availability of s 38B well in mind: whether it 
has a chilling effect on their activities is sRPHWKLQJ WKDWZRXOGUHSD\VWXG\¶96 This chapter 
cannot accommodate a detailed discussion of s 38B, but three brief observations may be 
made.  
 
First, the research interviews²not only with journalists, but also with lawyers²indicated 
very clearly that this section is having an effect on the media. Although prosecutions to date 
have only been against family and friends, there is nothing in the legislation or the case law to 
suggest a media prosecution is out of the question.97 It was clear that in-house lawyers, 
external lawyers and journalists are all acutely aware of the possibility that journalists may be 
prosecuted. Interviews revealed that at least two journalists had sought legal advice on s 38B 
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from outside their organisations. I was told nothing that indicated police or security services 
have threatened journalists with prosecution, or even highlighted this particular power, but 
that should not lead to an inference that prosecution is unlikely. Rather, it is more likely that 
the authorities know that the media will disclose information. Certainly, the interviews left no 
doubt that disclosures have been made by media organisations on a number of occasions. 
 
Second, although s 38B was considered when the CPS drafted guidelines for prosecution of 
cases likely to affect the media, it is not in the list of offences to which the guidelines apply.98 
Given the media awareness of the issue, the effects it has had, and the judicial statements that 
makes it clear it is a serious offence, there was and remains a strong case for inclusion.99 
While it may not be µlikely¶ in the sense that it will be frequently prosecuted, it seems no less 
likely than some of the other offences in what is quite a long list.  
 
[153] Third, the research interviews strongly suggest that s 38B is unnecessary where the 
media is concerned. There is little (if any) doubt that journalists and media organisations 
would disclose information in the circumstances contemplated by the Terrorism Act 2000. 
This does not mean an exemption or media-specific defence is appropriate. Instead, repeal of 
the section would be a better path. 
 
So, can it be said that there is a chilling effect? That is, are journalists changing their 
behaviour and self-censoring what they written or stepping back from asking investigative 
questions that may place them in difficult positions? At this stage, no, but if there was a 
prosecution, then that would almost certainly change. There would be a very high risk that 
journalism would become more cautious than it needs to be. Unless there were clear grounds 
and a very strong evidentiary and public interest case for prosecution, a chilling effect would 
seem inevitable.  
 
Conclusion 
Where terrorism and national security are concerned, openness should be the default position. 
Unless there are good reasons for secrecy, the state should disclose information about 
terrorism and security. At certain times and in relation to a limited range of issues, secrecy 
may of course be essential where national security matters are concerned. Even among the 
most robust proponents of free speech and openness in the UK, and among the most trenchant 
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sceptics of government behaviour, that proposition is widely accepted. But openness should 
be the presumptive starting point.  
 
However, as this chapter has suggested, the deck is stacked against openness. At formal and 
informal levels, information remains largely in the control of the state. Within Muslim 
communities the mainstream media faces great challenges in building trust, with those 
challenges arguably substantially a product of WKH PHGLD¶V own making. Journalists²even 
very experienced journalists with good contacts²find it very difficult to get reliable 
information and, importantly, to test the information they are given by the authorities. Even if 
imperfect, the courts are absolutely crucial avenues for obtaining information of great public 
interest. In terrorism and security matters, where information will be closely guarded by the 
state, the ability to adequately report court cases is essential if scrutiny of government is to be 
effective, if the threat of terrorism is to be understood, and if the public is to have confidence 
in the way that such threats are addressed. Things could and should be improved, but the 
main struggle at present is to ensure that open justice is not trumped by an all-
encompassing²whether necessary or not²national security priority. In the words of a 
journalist interviewee, µnational security is an easy umbrella to put up to deflect what you 
think is going to be troublesome rain¶.100  
 
Are journalists reckless about managing information relating to terrorism and security? The 
answer is, resoundingly, µno¶. Do journalists view their roles uncritically? Again, clearly, 
µno¶. An accountable and responsible state should not fear the media where national security 
or natural justice are at issue. In the practice of [154] journalism, as it emerged in the research 
interviews, the public interest in openness and the application of open justice principles are of 
vital importance, but it is ultimately secondary and will yield to primary priorities of natural 
justice and the public interest in national security. However, state controls over information 
currently make the gulf between these primary and secondary commitments unacceptably and 
unhealthily wide. There is still considerable scope to maintain and improve access to 
information before either natural justice or national security is threatened. 
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